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Has Money Lost Its Relevance?  
Resolving the Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle in the Small, Open Economies 
 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this study is to identify the monetary policy shock causing exchange rate 
fluctuations in the economies of India, Poland and the UK. For this purpose, an open-economy 
structural vector auto-regression model is used, resorting to data covering the period 2000-2015. 
The model used in the paper is appropriate for the small, open economies being analysed here as 
it facilitates estimation of theoretically correct and significant responses in terms of the price, 
output, and exchange rate to monetary policy tightening. The importance of monetary policy 
shock is established by examining the variance decomposition of forecast error, impulse 
response function, and out-of-sample forecast. The model also allows for the precise 
measurement of money through the adoption of a new monetary measure, namely, aggregation–
theoretic Divisia monetary aggregate. The empirical results lead to three critical findings. Firstly, 
it is imperative to consider the estimated responses of output, prices, money and exchange rate to 
monetary policy shocks in models using monetary aggregates. Secondly, the incorporation of 
Divisia money in monetary policy helps in explaining fluctuations in the exchange rate. Thirdly, 
the inclusion of Divisia money also promotes better out-of-sample forecasting of the exchange 
rate.   
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1. Introduction 
Many central banks actively resorted to an unconventional monetary policy, to deal with the 
impact of the recession of 2007–09. However, the adoption of this new policy has raised several 
questions: Do traditional structural vector autoregression (VAR) models aid in correctly 
appraising the level of liquidity in the small, open economies? How successful are open-
economy VAR models in reflecting the new policy stance of monetary authority? Can these 
models successfully explain fluctuations in the exchange rate? The extant empirical literature on 
monetary policy models does not provide lucid answers to these questions, and instead 
perpetrates ambiguity on a number of key concepts in this area, including the exchange rate 
puzzle,
1
 delayed overshooting, and the exchange rate disconnect puzzle,
2
 among other things.  
The traditional VAR models of open economies focus on the theoretical set-ups of a New 
Keynesian small open economy. These models are characterised by inflation, level of economic 
activity, short-term domestic rates of interest (which capture monetary policy), real exchange 
rate, and foreign interest rate (see Clarida et al., 2001; Svensson, 2000). One possible means of 
capturing the recent policy stance within the existing framework is the adoption of monetary 
                                                          
1
 The exchange rate puzzle occurs when a contractionary monetary policy leads to an impact depreciation of 
domestic currency instead of domestic currency appreciation as predicted by theory. If it appreciates and does so for 
a prolonged period of time, the violation of the uncovered interest parity condition is known as delayed 
overshooting. 
 
2
 The exchange rate disconnect puzzle refers to the weak short-run relationship between the exchange rate and its 
macroeconomic fundamentals. In other words, the underlying fundamentals, such as interest rates, do not explain the 
short-term volatility of the exchange rate. 
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aggregates in exchange rate models. For instance, it may not be advisable to measure the impact 
of monetary policy, and thereafter track policy transmission by using the interest rate alone, 
especially in a situation wherein the rates are stuck at near-zero.  
Practical considerations suggest that money should be included in the policy rule of the central 
bank. One such consideration is the fact that the central bank usually does not have 
contemporaneous information on inflation and output,
3
 but it has information about money stock. 
In such a case, money may help the central bank directly determine the current values of crucial 
variables (Goodfriend, 1999; Cochrane, 2007; Christiano et al., 2007; Nachane and Dubey, 
2011). Therefore, the role of ‘money’ should be acknowledged and understood in empirical 
literature (Hendrickson, 2014), especially in determining the exchange rate.  
The paper examines the economies of India, Poland, and the UK, which stand at various stages 
of the development spectrum. Cyclical fluctuations have occurred in both the advanced and 
emerging market economies, especially during the last decade, despite the structural differences 
between the two types of economies (Levine, 2012; Mallick and Sousa, 2012; Holtemöller and 
Mallick, 2016; Lane, 2003; and Mishkin, 2000). However, most erstwhile analyses have often 
focused on only similar and advanced industrial economies.
4
 The probable exception here is the 
                                                          
3 There is a time lag exists between the bank’s policy move and its access to data on inflation and output (Kim and 
Roubini, 2000).  
4
 For instance, Kim and Roubini (2000) focused on the non-US G7 industrial economies, such as Germany, Japan, 
the UK, France, Italy, and Canada. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) focused on advanced open economies, such as 
Japan, Germany, Italy, France, and the UK. Bjornland (2009) tested her findings on the economies of Australia, 
Canada, Sweden, and New Zealand. Similarly, Cover and Mallick (2012) tried to identify the sources of 
macroeconomic and exchange rate variation of the UK economy. 
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study by Mallick and Sousa (2012), which provides evidence of monetary policy transmission on 
the emerging market economies, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The 
period covered for the analysis in this study is 2000 to 2015. This period has been chosen to 
adequately gauge the effects of the new monetary policy of the central bank in the years leading 
up to and immediately following the financial crisis of 2007-08.  
The main purpose of the paper is to investigate the role of money in the determination of 
exchange rate. We have used monthly data for the Bayesian structural VAR models (SVAR) of 
open economies to identify the monetary policy shock responsible for exchange rate fluctuations 
and compared how the models that include money perform vis-à-vis models with no money. The 
importance of monetary policy shock is determined by examining impulse response function, 
forecast error variance decomposition, and out-of-sample forecast.  We show that our SVAR 
model with different measures of money (both simple sum and Divisia) estimates theoretically 
correct and significant responses of price, output, money and exchange rate to the tightening of 
monetary policy. The superiority of accurately measured monetary aggregates, such as Divisia, 
over simple-sum measures is also established. The estimated impulse responses of exchange rate 
to monetary policy shock are consistently significant with narrow error bands in models that use 
Divisia money. Models with Divisia money successfully address the exchange rate disconnect 
puzzle. The study finds that tightening of monetary policy (captured by the domestic short-term 
rate of interest) is an important driver of fluctuation in exchange rate. Additionally, models with 
Divisia money show superior out-of-sample forecasts of exchange rate compared to models that 
do not use money. 
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Section 2 further analyses existing literature and the results from this paper in details to 
underscore not only the importance of incorporating money as a concept in monetary policy but 
also the fact that tightening of monetary policy significantly influences fluctuations in the 
exchange rate.  In addition, it highlights our enterprise in using Divisia monetary aggregates for 
the three selected economies. The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 3 
undertakes SVAR estimation using impulse response analysis and thereafter presents the 
variance decomposition analysis. Section 4 contains the out-of-sample forecasting analysis. 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Assessment of the Aggregation-theoretic Divisia Monetary Aggregates and the Role of 
‘Money’ in the Monetary Policy Analysis. 
The use of an alternative micro-foundation theoretic monetary aggregate, such as the Divisia 
monetary index, has been proposed for the three economies under study. Divisia provides an 
index of ‘monetary services’ that captures the traditional transactional motive for holding money, 
that is, the money demand behaviour of the private sector. There is substantial literature studying 
the empirical and theoretical merits of these monetary aggregates (Barnett and Serletis, 2000; 
Belongia and Binner, 2001; Barnett and Chauvet, 2011; Barnett, 2012; Paul and Ramachandran, 
2011). Belongia and Ireland (2015) have acknowledged the role of monetary aggregates, 
especially accurately measured aggregates such as Divisia, in explaining aggregate fluctuations 
in the macroeconomic variables. This finding seems relevant in the context of the substantial 
change in the monetary policy stance following the fiscal crisis of 2008.
5
 
                                                          
5 Fed’s broad measure of money supply (M2) increased from 4 per cent to 6 per cent annually during the housing 
bubble, and then dropped to 2 per cent in 2010 in the aftermath of the burst. A measure from the New York-based 
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It is interesting to compare the behaviour of the Divisia monetary aggregates with its simple sum 
counterparts in the years leading up to and following the 2007-08 recession for the small, open 
economies. Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the year-on-year growth rates of narrow Divisia against 
simple sum M1, and simple sum M2 for UK, Divisia 3 against simple sum M3 for Poland, and, 
Divisia M3 against simple sum M3 for India, respectively. The most striking feature of these 
figures is that the growth rate of the simple sum monetary aggregates diverges markedly from 
the Divisia, before, during and after the recession of 2007-08. For instance, the simple sum M1 
grew at a much faster rate than the narrow Divisia during the 2007-08 recession for the UK. The 
difference in the growth rate between the simple sum M1 and the narrow Divisia was as high as 
15 per cent in February 2008 and the simple sum M1 consistently grew at a much faster pace of 
more than 5 per cent than the narrow Divisia between August 2007 and December 2008. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Center for Financial Stability that used Divisia monetary aggregate captures several kinds of money.  A technically 
sound computing method also found that the money supply (M2) in the U.S. increased from 6 per cent to 8 per cent 
during the bubble before shrinking to a negative growth number following the crisis. Similarly, the simple sum 
series overstated money growth during the episode of disinflation and financial deregulation of the early 1980s; such 
an overstatement was the result of a failure to internalise portfolio shifts out of traditional non-interest-bearing 
monetary assets into newly created less liquid, interest-earning accounts, such as money market mutual funds. 
Friedman’s prediction that the economy would return to high inflation during the period 1984–85 was based on the 
steady growth of the simple sum monetary aggregate. Barnett (2012) argued that Friedman might have reached a 
different conclusion had he monitored the data on the Divisia aggregate, which provided a strong and accurate signal 
of monetary tightness during the early 1980s. Divisia M2 also increased at a rate that consistently exceeded the 
growth rate of simple sum M2, especially during the periods characterised by falling interest rates, that is, 1990–
1991, 2001, and the recession of 2007–09 (Belongia and Ireland, 2015). 
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Similarly, the difference in the growth rate between simple sum M3 and Divisia 3 for Poland 
exceeded 5 per cent between November 2008 and July 2009.  
 
Fig 1: Growth Rates of Simple Sum M1, Simple Sum M3 and Narrow Divisia Monetary 
Aggregates, UK (year on year) 
 
                                 Data Source: Bank of England. 
 
During the recession of 2007-08, the Bank of England (BOE) laid an emphasis on the portfolio-
balance effect, buying large stocks of financial assets from investors with the newly created 
money. BOE proceeded to rebalance their portfolio by acquiring financial assets of different 
risks and maturity. In doing so, the central bank attempted to raise asset prices, lower interest 
rates, reduce borrowing costs, and encourage households and businesses to increase their 
investments. The graphical representation indicates that during periods when the monetary 
policies of the central banks are accommodative or unconventional, broad monetary aggregates 
like simple sum M3 tend to move in the opposite direction from the Divisia counterparts. The 
reason for this occurrence is that the construction of quantity indices like Divisia is based on the 
index number theory, which can take in pure substitution effects that, by definition, occur when 
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the levels of monetary service flows are unaltered. On the other hand, the simple sum measures 
fail to incorporate pure substitution effects, as a result of which interest rate movements cause 
shifts in a simple sum aggregate, even when there has been no change in monetary service flows. 
 
Figure 2: Growth Rates of Divisia 3, simple sum M3, Poland (year on year) 
 
                            Data Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
In the case of India, going back in time between March 1996 and February 1997 would also 
reveal that the growth in simple sum M3 outpaced the Divisia M3 growth by more than 5 per 
cent. The early policy of financial liberalisation in India focused on gradually freeing and raising 
interest rates, improving and strengthening the bank regulation, and simplifying the regulations 
under which Non-bank Financial Corporations (NBFCs) to operate.  Therefore, such episodes 
highlight the failure of simple sum measures to deal with the advent of financial innovations in 
India that began in the 1990s.  
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Figure 3: Growth Rates of Divisia M3, Simple Sum M3, India (year on year) 
 
                             Data Source: Ramachandran, et al., 2010. 
 
It is important to understand the channels through which a shock to the monetary aggregates 
influences exchange rates. The classical flexible price monetary model provides the basic 
channel of transmission between the monetary aggregates and exchange rate. The bilateral 
exchange rate, by definition, is the price of one currency in terms of another. The relative prices 
in such models are determined by the supply and demand for money in the two countries. It is 
assumed that the money demand in the respective countries is a function of output and the 
opportunity cost of holding money, that is, the interest rate (user cost). Therefore, the bilateral 
exchange rate in the flexible price model becomes a function of the relative monetary aggregates, 
relative outputs, and relative interest rates (user cost) in the two countries. While the flexible 
price model offers the basic structure, the assumptions underlying such a model are generally 
strong. Dornbusch’s exchange rate model, on the other hand, postulates that prices are sticky in 
the short run, and can explain short-run overshooting of the exchange rate.  However, in the case 
of both the sticky price and flexible price monetary models, the money supply and variables that 
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determine the money demand, such as output and interest rate (user cost), play an important role 
in explaining exchange rate movements.
6
  
In view of its goal of investigating the role of money in determining the exchange rate, the study 
contributes to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, monthly data for the Bayesian SVAR 
of open economies has been used to identify the monetary policy shock responsible for exchange 
rate fluctuations and to compare the performance of models incorporating money vis-à-vis 
models with no money. This is achieved by cross-comparing the sources of exchange rate 
fluctuations in three different models, that is, models with interest rate (and no monetary 
aggregate), models with interest rate and simple-sum monetary aggregates, and models with 
interest rate and Divisia money. The performances of the models have been assessed in 
accordance with the four puzzles that have plagued the empirical literature on open-economy 
macroeconomics, namely, the liquidity, price, exchange rate, and the forward discount bias 
puzzles.  
Impulse response graphs have been provided for the recursive and non-recursive models without 
money, non-recursive models with simple-sum monetary aggregates, and non-recursive models 
with Divisia monetary aggregates for India, Poland, and the UK, respectively. Almost all the 
puzzles persist in the no-money recursive models, especially the price puzzle, exchange rate 
puzzle, and forward discount bias puzzle. The exchange rate puzzle is produced by the impact 
depreciation of currency caused by a one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate. Further, 
even if the currency appreciates with a contractionary monetary policy shock, it does so for a 
                                                          
6 Barnett and Kwag (2005) found that the introduction of Divisia aggregates into money market equilibrium helps in 
improving the forecasting performance of the monetary models of exchange rate. 
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prolonged period of time, a situation characterised as the forward discount puzzle. 
Contractionary monetary policy shocks also lead to a persistent rise in inflation, thereby 
producing a price puzzle (see Barnett et al., 2016)
7
.   
Secondly, the study finds that tightening of monetary policy (captured by the domestic short-
term rate of interest) is an important driver of fluctuation in the exchange rate. This finding is 
especially applicable for models that have adopted the monetary aggregates (money demand), 
wherein the monetary policy, along with simple-sum and Divisia aggregates, respectively, 
explain up to 6 per cent and 35 per cent of the exchange rate fluctuation for the UK. This 
monetary policy shock in the no-money model explains only 2 per cent of the variance 
decomposition of forecast error of the exchange rate of the British pound per US dollar (USD), a 
result similar to that arrived at by Cover and Mallick (2012). The monetary policy of India 
explains 12 per cent and 22 per cent of the fluctuation in the exchange rate in models that 
adopted monetary aggregates simple sum and Divisia, respectively. The monetary policy of 
Poland in models that adopted simple sum and Divisia can explain 14 per cent and 33 per cent of 
the exchange rate fluctuation, respectively. This monetary policy shock in the no-money model 
explains only 17 per cent of the variance decomposition of the forecast error of Indian rupees 
(per USD) and 2 per cent of the variance decomposition of the forecast error of Polish zloty (per 
                                                          
7 Holtemöller and Mallick (2016) depict the impact appreciation of the real effective exchange rate due to a tight 
monetary policy in India, wherein monetary policy has been captured in a standard New Keynesian framework. 
However, the currency kept appreciating persistently, showing the existence of a forward discount bias puzzle. The 
SVAR model for Poland deployed by Darvas (2013) and Kapuscinski et al. (2013) indicates the presence of price 
puzzles. Although Cover and Mallick (2012) have estimated puzzle-free impulse responses to a monetary policy 
shock for the exchange rate and price in the UK, the responses remain insignificant. This could be because their 
model did not include money. 
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USD). Additionally, models with Divisia money show superior out-of-sample forecasts of the 
exchange rate as compared to models that do not use money. 
Thirdly, the study has further provided channels for how a shock to a monetary aggregate 
(money demand) can affect the other variables in the model including the exchange rate (see 
Appendix: Figure H, Figure I, Figure J). This is achieved by cross-comparing the impact of 
money demand shock in two different model set-ups , that is, models with interest rate (and 
simple sum monetary aggregate), and models with interest rate (and Divisia money).The 
contributions are similar to Barnett and Kwag (2005) and Ireland (2001a; 2001b). The latter 
found empirical evidence supporting the inclusion of money growth in the interest rate rule for 
policy, where in money plays an informational rather than a causal role by forecasting the future 
nominal interest rate. Other studies have emphasised the “information content” of monetary 
aggregates in predicting inflation and output (see Masuch et al., 2003; Bruggeman et al., 2005). 
The following sections detail the methodology and empirical results used for arriving at these 
findings.  
 
3. SVAR Estimation Model 
The equation representing the dynamic structural models in vector form is 
                                                                                              (3.1) 
where    is an     data vector,   is an     data vector of constants and    is an     
structural disturbances vector.    is serially and mutually uncorrelated.   denotes the number of 
lags. 
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                                                                          (3.2) 
Bs is a (   ) matrix whose row i, column j element is given by Bij
(s)
 for   =1, 2...  . 
If each side of [2.1] is pre-multiplied by B0
-1
, the result is  
                                                                                             (3.3) 
where,       
                                                                                                                          (3.4) 
                  
                                                                                           (3.5) 
                   
                                                                                                              (3.6) 
Thus, VAR can be viewed as the reduced form of a general dynamic structural model. The 
structural disturbance    and reduced form residuals     are related by 
                                                                                                                                            (3.7) 
The model should be either exactly identified or over-identified for estimating the parameters 
from the structural form equations. A necessary condition for exact identification is that the 
number of parameters in B0 and D (covariance matrix of the structural form,      
   ) should 
be same as that in    the covariance matrix from the reduced form,   . This can be achieved by 
using the Cholesky decomposition of reduced form innovations (Sims, 1980), which imposes a 
recursive structure to identify the model. The non-recursive structural VAR methods can also be 
used with the restriction imposed on contemporaneous relations between the variables based on 
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economic theory (Bernanke, 1986). The identification restrictions can be imposed in various 
ways, such as imposition of restrictions on B0 or on B0
-1
 or of long-run restrictions.  
Letting   denote the variance-covariance matrix of   , implies  
   (    
 )    
   (    
 )(  
  )    
   (  
  )                                                        (3.8) 
Since   is symmetric, it has n(n+1)/2 parameters. It is standard practice in SVAR literature to 
have D as the diagonal matrix, which requires n parameters. Hence, B0 can have no more than 
n(n-1)/2 restrictions for facilitating an exact identification. B0 is a triangular matrix for the VAR 
with a Cholesky decomposition of the innovations. The validity of such a recursive structure is 
difficult to justify theoretically. 
A simple two-step maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) procedure can be employed for 
producing an exactly identified model, assuming that the structural errors are jointly normal. 
This is the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator for the SVAR model. First,   
is estimated as:             
  ̂ = (1/T) ∑   ̂
 
      ̂                                                                                                        (3.9) 
Estimates of B0 and D are then obtained by maximising the log likelihood for the system 
conditioned on ̂ .  However, when the model is over-identified, the two-step procedure is not the 
FIML estimator for the SVAR model. The estimates are consistent but not efficient as they do 
not take the over-identification restrictions into account while estimating the reduced form. For 
an over-identified system, the VAR model is estimated both without additional restrictions and 
with additional restrictions, to obtain ‘unrestricted’ and ‘restricted’ variance-covariance matrix, 
respectively, by maximising the likelihood function. The difference in the determinants of the 
restricted and unrestricted variance-covariance matrix will be distributed     with the degrees of 
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freedom being equal to the number of additional restrictions exceeding a just identified system. 
The    test statistic has been used to test the restricted system. 
A 7-variable VAR has been used in the study, which includes the world oil price index (oil), the 
federal fund rate (rfed), the index of industrial production (iip), the level of inflation in the 
domestic small open economy ( ), a domestic monetary aggregate (MD), nominal short-term 
domestic interest rate (rdom) producing monetary policy shocks (MP), and the nominal exchange 
rate in domestic currency per US dollar (ER). The identification scheme, based on Equation 3.10, 
is detailed below. 
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                         (3.10) 
The vector of structural innovations is denoted by  , whereas   is the vector of errors from the 
reduced form equations. The identification scheme is based on K&R and has been slightly 
modified to fit the three economies. Based on the assumptions that hold for small, open 
economies, world shock (as captured by the world oil price index) and foreign interest rate (as 
captured by the federal funds rate in the USA) contemporaneously affect the domestic economy, 
but none of the domestic variables can affect them contemporaneously. However, the federal 
funds rate is only contemporaneously affected by world event shocks.. Following K&R, it is 
imperative to include these variables to isolate and control the exogenous component of 
monetary policy shocks. Both industrial production and inflation in small, open economies is 
deeply affected by occurrences in the world and by outside shocks. However, the output and 
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prices do not respond contemporaneously to changes in the domestic monetary policy variables 
and exchange rates. Real activity, such as industrial production, responds to domestic price and 
financial signals with a lag because of high adjustment costs to production. The money demand 
function usually depends on real income and the domestic interest rate, whereas in an open 
economy, it also depends on the foreign interest rate and the prevailing exchange rates. Allowing 
for contemporaneous interaction between money and the exchange rate helps in determining the 
performance of different monetary aggregates at play in the respective monetary policies of these 
economies and the manner in which they contribute in explaining the exchange rate movements. 
The reaction function (or monetary policy) of monetary authority helps set the interest rate in 
accordance with the current value of money supply, interest rate, and exchange rate. 
 
The data have been arranged in monthly frequency with the estimation periods ranging that from 
January 2000 to January 2008, December 2001 to June 2015, and January 2001 to January 2013 
for India, Poland, and the UK, respectively. The seasonally adjusted indices of production of the 
total industry for the UK, Poland, and India have been obtained from the production and sales 
[Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI)] database of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The consumer price indices,  wherein all items are 
seasonally adjusted, for all the three economies under study have been  obtained from the 
consumer prices as given in the OECD database. The interest rate, immediate interest rate/call 
money/interbank rate (per cent per annum) for the UK, Poland, and India have also been 
obtained from MEI (in the OECD database). The simple-sum monetary aggregates M1 and M3 
are the seasonally adjusted narrow and broad money indices, respectively, for the UK, Poland, 
and India. The values of the nominal exchange rate (the national currency per USD, monthly 
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average) for the UK, Poland, and India have been derived from the MEI and OECD databases. 
The monthly crude oil price (per barrel) has been obtained from Index Mundi. 
 
The Divisia data, which include the monthly index of monetary financial institutions and the 
sterling Divisia for the UK, have been taken from the database of the Bank of England. Divisia 
M1, M2, and M3 (which correspond to their simple-sum counterparts, M1, M2, and M3, 
respectively) have been abstracted from the database of the National Bank of Poland, while the 
Divisia monetary aggregates DM2, DM3, and DL1 for India have been derived from 
Ramachandran et al., 2010.The estimation period for India is constrained by the availability of a 
short sample of Divisia data (ibid.) The Center for Financial Stability in New York maintains the 
data resource, the International Advances in Monetary and Financial Measurement, which has 
links to the Divisia data for the UK, Poland, and India. The series has been seasonally adjusted 
by official sources, except for the Indian Divisia world oil prices, which have instead been 
seasonally adjusted by using frequency domain de-seasonalisation in RATS (see Doan, 2013). 
All variables except interest rates have been expressed in logarithms, except interest rates. 
Inflation ( ) has been calculated as the annual change in log of consumer prices whereas the 
monthly VAR has been arrived at by using six lags for India and 13 lags for the UK and Poland, 
which, in turn, have been selected by using the sequential likelihood ratio test in RATS (see 
Doan, 2013). The result from the sequential likelihood ratio test is presented in Table A in the 
Appendix. The likelihood ratio test reported comparisons of VAR with   lags and VAR with ( -
1) lags. The null hypothesis suggests that all coefficients on the  th lags of the endogenous 
variables are zero. The lag has been selected in accordance with the value of the lag wherein the 
20 
 
null hypothesis has been rejected. The absence of serial correlation has also been confirmed at 
the selected lags.
8
  
 
Table B in the Appendix also reports the largest Eigen values of the estimated VARs for 
different lags for the three countries under study. An Eigen value of less than unity implies that 
the estimated VAR value satisfies the stability conditions. Appendices C and D provide the 
impulse response functions of monetary policy shocks for the three countries in a 6-variable 
model that excludes money. The ‘no-money’ models have been estimated by using the recursive 
identification assumption (Cholesky decomposition) and non-recursive assumptions. The number 
of lags used for the purpose of rendering comparisons were 6 for India and 13 for the UK and 
Poland each. The non-recursive 6-variable model imposes the same identification assumptions 
for the first four variables, that is, the world prices of oil, the fed funds rate, industrial 
production, and inflation. The only change observed in the ‘no-money’ model is that the 
monetary policy and exchange rate no longer depend on the monetary aggregate while the rest of 
the assumptions remain the same. The ‘no-money’ models are fraught with various puzzles, as 
discussed in detail in the following section. 
 
3.1. Impulse Response Analysis 
                                                          
8
 If the data is adequate, it is recommended that approximately a year’s worth of lags be used, as a year’s worth and 
one extra lag can help deal with seasonal effects. The robustness check of the results presented here was also 
performed on the basis of different lags and sample, and has been presented as part of the results in the Appendix. 
However, the main conclusion of the paper remains unchanged. For example, 6 lags were used for the UK and 
Poland instead of 13, and 4 were used for India instead of 6 (due to the availability of short Indian Divisia data).  
The absence of serial correlation has been checked at all the selected lags, and the results are available on request. 
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The SVAR model has been evaluated in terms of the four prevalent puzzles in empirical 
literature, namely, the liquidity, price, exchange rate, and the forward discount bias puzzles. 
Most of these puzzles have been eliminated for all the three countries. The results are robust for 
different samples, lags, and monetary aggregates. The model delineated her correctly identifies 
monetary policies for India, Poland, and the UK. As shown in the authors’ previous work 
(Barnett et al., 2016), the behaviour of a private agent (money demand) should be separated from 
the central bank’s policy (money supply) before assessing the effects of monetary policy on the 
economy. This approach calls for the inclusion of money in the models of exchange rates to 
capture money demand. Moreover, it is recommended that Divisia money should be incorporated 
in monetary policy because it can help weigh the different monetary components, thereby 
facilitating a proper summary of services rendered by money in the policy.  
This section contains a detailed impulse response analysis for comparing the performance of 
models with Divisia money vis-à-vis that of models with simple-sum money. Appendices C and 
D report impulse responses for ‘no money’ models in a recursive (R) and non-recursive (NR) 
setting. The responses with regard to the exchange rate, money demand, output, and prices are 
free from puzzles, and in accordance with the theory, especially in the model with Divisia 
money. The statistical significance of the impulse responses have been examined by using the 
Bayesian Monte Carlo integration in RATS. The random walk Metropolis–Hastings method has 
been used to draw 25,000 replications for the over-identified SVAR model. The 0.16 and 0.84 
fractiles correspond to the upper and lower lines of the probability bands (see Doan, 2013). 
India: Figure 4 compares the impulse response graphs of the SVAR model with simple-sum M3 
(left panel) and Divisia M3 (right panel) for India. The exchange rate is seen to appreciate on 
impact and to depreciate thereafter in both models under a contractionary monetary policy. A 
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one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate results in an approximately 4 per cent 
appreciation of the rupee vis-à-vis the US dollar for models with Divisia as opposed to a 2 per 
cent impact appreciation of the exchange rate in models with simple-sum money, as shown in the 
point estimates. However, the response of the exchange rate (impact appreciation and subsequent 
depreciation) is significant in the left panel as compared to that in the right panel. Therefore, it is 
obvious that the model with Divisia money can capture a strong impact of the exchange rate that 
overshoots to monetary policy shock as compared with the model that adopts simple-sum M3. 
The recursive model with no money (Appendix C) is burdened by price and exchange rate 
puzzles. The non-recursive, no-money model can eliminate these two puzzles, but the point 
estimate of the output attributed to monetary policy shock remains positive. Holtemöller and 
Mallick (2016) show the impact appreciation of real effective exchange rate for India due to a 
tight monetary policy. However, the persistent appreciation in the currency shows the existence 
of a forward discount bias puzzle. The monetary policy is captured in a standard New Keynesian 
setting in the paper by Holtemöller and Mallick. 
A one-percentage increase in the interest rate causes the money demand to fall for a few months 
in both models, but the impulse responses become significant only in the left panel. After the 
monetary policy shock, inflation falls by approximately 3 per cent in the left panel and by 1.2 per 
cent in the right panel. The liquidity effect, price effect, and exchange rate overshooting are more 
pronounced (significant) in the model with Divisia M3 than that with simple-sum M3. 
Additionally, the error confidence bands are generally narrow for models using Divisia 
aggregates. This finding points to a high degree of precision in the estimation of Divisia money 
models.   
 
23 
 
Figure 4: INDIA 
Impulse Responses for Monetary Policy Shocks  
 
Model with Divisia M3 
 
Model with M3  
  
  
  
  
Output
5 10 15 20
-7.5
-2.5
2.5
7.5
Output
5 10 15 20
-6
-2
2
6
Inflation
5 10 15 20
-4
-2
0
2
Inflation
5 10 15 20
-2.5
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
Money
5 10 15 20
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Money
5 10 15 20
-4
-2
0
2
4
Interest Rate
5 10 15 20
-0.8
-0.4
-0.0
0.4
0.8
Interest Rate
5 10 15 20
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
24 
 
  
 
The United Kingdom: Figure 5 compares the impulse response graphs of the SVAR model with 
Divisia money (left panel), simple-sum M1 (middle panel), and simple-sum M3 (right panel). A 
one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate results in an approximately 1.5 per cent 
appreciation of the pound vis-à-vis the US dollar for the model with Divisia money. A similar 
result is observed for the model that uses simple-sum M3. The response of the exchange rate 
(impact appreciation and subsequent depreciation) to a monetary policy shock is significant in all 
the three cases. However, the response of the exchange rate is more pronounced in the model that 
contains simple-sum M1. Cover and Mallick (2012) used the SVAR model in the UK to estimate 
puzzle-free impulse responses for the exchange rate and prices but their responses are mainly 
insignificant. Their model does not include monetary aggregates to separately identify money 
demand shock.  
The model with Divisia money shows that the money demand drops significantly by 0.06 per 
cent on impact and declines permanently following the policy shock. The model with simple-
sum M1 exhibits a liquidity puzzle, wherein the money demand increases with an increase in the 
interest rates. The model with simple-sum M3 provides accurate but insignificant responses 
pertaining to the models using money.  
The prices show a correct response, wherein the inflation rate remains below zero for the first 10 
months following the tightening of monetary policy. This effect is significant for the model with 
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Divisia money. The model with simple-sum M1 exhibits a price puzzle. A significant and 
permanent reduction in the output occurs due to a contractionary monetary policy shock. 
Industrial production shows a low positive response to the impact of a contractionary monetary 
policy shock and begins to drop significantly after a couple of months of the tightening of policy 
in the Divisia models. The same is not true for simple-sum models or no-money non-recursive 
(see Appendix D) models, wherein the fall in output is largely insignificant. The Cholesky 
decomposition in the no-money models (see Appendix C) shows both price and exchange rate 
puzzles. 
Figure 5: UK 
Impulse responses for Monetary Policy Shocks  
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Poland: Figure 6 compares the impulse response graphs of the SVAR model with Divisia M3 (in 
the left panel) and with simple-sum M3 (in the right panel) for Poland. A one-percentage-point 
increase in the interest rate results in an approximately 6 per cent appreciation of the Polish zloty 
vis-à-vis the US dollar for the Divisia model, whereas a 4.5 per cent appreciation is observed in 
the model with simple-sum M3. An impact appreciation of the exchange rate to a monetary 
policy shock is observed, followed by a mild yet significant depreciation in the left panel. The 
puzzle-free results for the price and exchange rate for Poland, especially in the model with 
Divisia money, are in sharp contrast to the results found in the existing literature. Kapuscinski et 
al. (2013) used four endogenous variables, namely, output, price, interest rate, and real effective 
exchange rate, to estimate a SVAR model for Poland. Monetary policy tightening leads to a price 
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puzzle and insignificant fluctuations in the interest rate in the model when Cholesky and semi-
Cholesky decompositions are used. Darvas (2013) used a structural time-varying coefficient 
VAR in a similar 4-variable framework and found a price puzzle.  
A rise of one per cent in the interest rate causes the money demand to fall significantly, leading 
to a short-lasting impact. The prices show a correct response, wherein the inflation rate remains 
below zero for the first eight months after the tightening of monetary policy. Following the 
contractionary monetary policy shock, inflation temporarily falls by around 0.05 per cent for 
both cases. Finally, a restrictive monetary policy exhibits a negligible effect on the output for 
models with Divisia money, but the right panel records a significant rise in output from the 2 to 8 
month period, showing the occurrence of an output puzzle. Therefore, the responses with regard 
to exchange rate, money demand, and prices to the monetary tightening are puzzle-free, precise 
in terms of tighter error bands, and in accordance with the theory, especially in the model with 
Divisia M3. 
Figure 6: POLAND 
Impulse Responses for Monetary Policy Shocks 
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MC Convergence Test: Table C in the Appendix provides a check for Monte Carlo 
convergence using the Geweke test. This examines the behaviour of the model over the long run 
rather than focusing on short-run auto-correlation analysis. It reports the mean, numerical 
standard error (NSE) and Geweke CD measure. Using robust estimates of the variance of the 
means, it tests whether the mean at the start of the keeper draws is the same as the mean at the 
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end of keeper draws.. Hence, the null hypothesis of the test is defined as a check to determine 
whether the two parts of the chain are asymptotically independent or not.  The Geweke CD 
measure is normally distributed with mean one and variance zero. The critical values at the 10 
per cent and 1 per cent significance levels are 1.645 and 2.575, respectively. As can be seen from 
the absolute value of the CD measure for the contemporaneous coefficients, they do not fall in 
the rejection region, that is, the null hypothesis is not rejected. Hence, this ensures good 
estimations provided by the model used in this study. 
3.2. Variance Decomposition 
The variance decomposition of the exchange rate to monetary policy shock is evaluated in Table 
1. Results without money in recursive and non-recursive models and with different forms of 
monetary aggregates are reported. The model that contains the Divisia monetary aggregate is 
seen to perform relatively better than the model with simple-sum money or the model with no 
money. The results in this section support the argument that the mere addition of money in the 
VARs is not sufficient for capturing the private sector’s demand for money. The type of money 
added is also important. 
Models with simple-sum M3, Divisia M3, Divisia M2, Divisia L1, and models with no money 
are reported for India. It is observed that generally, models with Divisia money perform better 
than models with simple-sum money (M3) or models with no money in terms of the monetary 
policy contributing more to the exchange rate variation at each step in the future horizon. For 
example, the monetary policy in the model with Divisia M3 explains 14 per cent of the exchange 
rate variation occurring at the first month, which increases to 16 per cent at the fourth month. 
The contribution of monetary policy shocks then declines gradually. In contrast, the monetary 
policy shock in the model with simple-sum M3 explains only 8 per cent of the exchange rate 
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variation at the first month, which increases marginally to 10 per cent in the fourth month and to 
9 per cent in the eighth month. Hence, the use of Divisia money helps in correctly capturing the 
money demand behaviour of private agents. In fact, the performance of the monetary policy in 
the model with simple-sum money is worse than that of the model with no money in explaining 
fluctuations in exchange rates. 
The results for the UK from the models with simple-sum M1, simple-sum M3 and narrow 
Divisia measure, along with the ‘no money’ models are presented in Table 2. During the initial 
months, no substantial difference is observed in the amount of exchange rate fluctuations 
explained by the monetary policy in the models with money as compared to those models with 
no money except in the case using M1 money. The model with M1 money exhibits good 
performance at the initial horizon, but its effect wanes during the later stages. The model with 
Divisia money allows for monetary policy to explain fluctuations in the exchange rate as we 
move ahead in the forecasting horizon. The interest rate can be used to explain 4 per cent of the 
exchange rate variation in the first month with its contribution increasing significantly to 16 per 
cent in the 20
th
 month and to 18 in the 24
th
 month in the model using Divisia money. The ‘no 
money’ model performs poorly in explaining the exchange rate fluctuations during all-time 
horizons of the analysis. The ‘no money’ SVAR models in literature indicate that monetary 
policy shock plays a small role in explaining the variation in the exchange rate. According to 
Cover and Mallik (2012), the monetary policy shock explains variations of only 1–4 per cent in 
the exchange rate until the 30
th
 step in the forecast horizon. Similar results are obtained in the 
case of the ‘no money’ models with a similar band of 1–4 per cent. The addition of Divisia 
money facilitates an improvement in the model and helps explain up to 18 per cent of exchange 
rate fluctuations. 
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The variance decomposition analysis for the models with no money, simple-sum M2, simple-
sum M3, Divisia M2, and Divisia M3 were also evaluated for Poland. Generally, monetary 
policy shocks in models that contain the Divisia monetary aggregate were seen to perform 
slightly better than their simple-sum counterparts in capturing variations in the exchange rate. 
However, the money demand shock (see Table 2) in the Divisia models plays a lead role and is 
discussed in detail later. The monetary policy shock for the model with simple-sum M3 explains 
4 per cent of the variation in the exchange rate in the first month, 2 per cent in the fourth month, 
and 7 per cent in the 24
th
 month. In contrast, the model with Divisia M3 explains 7 per cent of 
the exchange rate variation in the first month, 3 per cent in the fourth month, and 7 per cent in 
the 24
th
 month. Similarly, the model with Divisia M2 performs better than the model that 
contains simple-sum M2.  
Table 1: Variance Decomposition of Exchange Rate due to Monetary Policy Shocks 
 
Month 1 2 4 8 12 16 20 24 
INDIA 
Model-R (No-Money)    10   10   12   11     9    8     7   6 
Model-NR (No-Money)    14   14   17   15    12    10    10   9 
Model-NR (M3)      8     8                           10                          9             7     6     6       5 
Model-NR (DivisiaM3)    14              14                16           14               12            11             10            8 
Model-NR (DivisiaM2)    17         18            21      15            13           12             11            9 
Model-NR (DivisiaL1)    14           15           16           14                      12         12        11    8 
UK 
Model-R (No-Money) 2 3 4 2 3 2 2 2 
Model-NR (No-Money) 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
Model-NR (M1) 11 9 5 3 4 2 3 3 
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Model-NR (M3) 4 2 2 2 5 3 5 5 
Model-NR (Divisia) 4 2 3 4 9 10 16 18 
POLAND 
Model-R (No-Money) 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 2 
Model-NR (No-Money) 5 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 
Model-NR (M2) 5 3 2 2 2 2 3 8 
Model-NR (Divisia2) 7 4 3 3 3 4 4 7 
Model-NR (M3) 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 7 
Model-NR (Divisia3) 7 4 3 3 4 4 4 7 
 
The variance decomposition of the exchange rate to the money demand shock is evaluated in 
Table 2. The performances of the models with different monetary aggregates are also assessed in 
the table. The ‘no money’ VAR models failed to capture the money demand shocks separately. 
Hence, no values are reported.  
 
Table 2 shows that a money demand shock in the models with simple sum and Divisia monetary 
aggregates in India does not result in significant differences. Similarly, no significant differences 
were observed in models that contain Divisia monetary aggregates at different levels of 
aggregation. The money demand shock by itself cannot explain most of the variations in 
exchange rates. However, the inclusion of the monetary aggregate may help in enabling 
monetary policy shocks to explain the dynamics of exchange rate dynamics observed in Table 1. 
Hence, monetary aggregates act as informational variables rather than causal ones, especially in 
explaining variations in the exchange rate.   
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Table 2: Variance Decomposition of Exchange Rate due to Money Demand Shocks 
Month 1 2 4 8 12 16 20 24 
INDIA 
Model(M3)      1              2       2          3             2             2                2     3 
Model(DivisiaM3)      1    <1          1     2     2     3     4     3 
Model(DivisiaM2)     <1           1              1               1     1              2              3              2 
Model(DivisiaL1)     <1     <1         1          2              2           3                  4              3 
UK 
Model(M1) 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Model(M3) 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Model(Divisia) 1 1 2 10 12 13 15 17 
POLAND 
Model(M2) 5 6 8 12 15 12 14 12 
Model(Divisia2) 4 12 27 30 27 17 12    10 
Model(M3) 4 4 7 11 15 12 12 11 
 
Table 2 highlights how the model with narrow Divisia is better than the simple-sum M1 and 
simple-sum M3 in terms of the ability of money demand shocks to explain fluctuations in the 
exchange rate in the UK, especially in long horizons. Therefore, the Divisia monetary aggregate 
for the UK acts as both an informational and a causal variable, by itself explaining a large part of 
the exchange rate variations while also facilitating an explanation of fluctuations in the exchange 
rate through the use of monetary policy.  
The money demand shock can substantially explain exchange rate variations for Poland as 
reported by simple-sum and Divisia models in Table 2. Models with Divisia M2 are significantly 
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better than their simple-sum counterparts because the money demand shock explains as much as 
30 per cent of the exchange rate variations in the third step. The importance of including Divisia 
in the exchange rate models in Poland is established in Table 2. 
 
4. Forecast Statistics for the Exchange Rate 
In this section, out-of-sample forecasts of exchange rates in different-money and no-money 
models have been made to evaluate: (1) changes in forecasting performance when money is 
added to the system; and (2) variations in the results obtained with different types of money. The 
forecast performance of a model has been assessed in terms of the root mean square error 
(RMSE) as shown in Table 3. The “out-of-sample” forecasts within the data range have been 
calculated by using the Kalman filter to prepare the model by using data from the starting period 
of each set of forecasts. The RMSE has been compiled over the sample period and expressed 
through the following formula: 
            ̂                                                                                                              (4.1)              
where  ̂   is the forecast at step t from the ith call and     is the actual value of the dependent 
variable. Let    be the number of times that a forecast has been computed for horizon t,   
            
        √
∑    
   
   
  
⁄                                                                                               (4.2) 
Table 3 evaluates models with no money, simple sums, and Divisia in terms of the RMSE 
statistics. The models have been estimated and updates performed for all the three economies in 
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24 steps using the Kalman filter. For the UK, the model has been estimated through 2012: 12 and 
updates have been performed from 2013: 1 to 2014: 12; for Poland, the model has been 
estimated through 2013: 6 and updates have been performed from 2013: 7 to 2015: 6; and for 
India, the model has been estimated through 2006: 6 and updates performed from 2006: 7 to 
2008: 6.  
 
Table 3: Forecast Statistic Root Mean Square Error 
Steps                              1                                  2 4 8 12 20 24 
INDIA 
              
Mod(No Money) 0.016815 0.027932 0.045089 0.081641 0.115957 0.130826 0.082897 
Model(DivisiaM3) 0.016817 0.02794 0.045093 0.08162 0.11592 0.130837 0.082902 
Model(M3) 0.016819 0.027943 0.045097 0.081626 0.115927 0.130855 0.082923 
 
UK 
              
Mod(No Money) 0.016 0.026 0.037 0.039 0.043 0.128 0.394 
Model(M1) 0.016 0.025 0.038 0.068 0.106 0.193 0.235 
Model(M3) 0.016 0.026 0.039 0.06 0.097 0.229 0.523 
Model(N-Divisia) 0.014 0.022 0.027 0.022 0.034 0.015 0.045 
POLAND 
              
Model(No Money) 2.45 3.84 7.65 14.56 16.92 21.52 19.35 
Model(M1) 2.48 3.92 8 15.82 17.53 19.54 16.48 
Model(Divisia1) 2.46 3.85 7.82 15.62 17.46 19.79 17.14 
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Model(M3) 2.46 3.84 7.51 13.97 16.68 20.43 18.2 
Model(Divisia3) 2.42 3.7 7.4 14.47 16.65 20.72 18.66 
 
For India, the model with Divisia M3 shows a lower RMSE than the model with simple-sum M3 
at every forecast horizon until 24 steps. However, when the RMSE of the model without money 
is compared with that of the model with Divisia money, mixed results are obtained with RMSE 
values that are very close to each other. For some forecast horizons, the model without money is 
slightly better while for others, the model with Divisia money does better. The inclusion of an 
extra variable implies loss of degrees of freedom in the regression. Thus, if a variable is added in 
the forecasting analysis, which does not have significant information content, this approach 
could lead to deterioration in the forecasting performance of the model. In India’s case, adding 
money, especially Divisia money, improves the forecasting performance at some horizons (in 
terms of lower RMSE). The RMSE values are better and close to the no-money models for other 
horizons. This finding corroborates two facts: firstly, the money variable contains crucial 
information on exchange rates that should not be ignored, and secondly, Divisia ensures superior 
performance as compared to other forms of money. 
No conclusive result is obtained for the UK in terms of the RMSE when models with no money 
are compared with models with simple-sum monetary aggregates (Table 3). In some forecasting 
horizon, the model with no money performs better than models with simple-sum money. 
However, the model that contains Divisia consistently performs better than other models at every 
forecast horizon. The RMSE for the model with the narrow Divisia is at the minimum level of 
0.014 at a one-step ahead horizon.  
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For Poland (Table 3), the model with Divisia M3 demonstrates the best performance when 
compared with other models (no-money and simple-sum models). The model with no money 
performs better than the model with money at few forecast horizons. The models at broad levels 
of aggregation perform better than their narrower counterparts. When the RMSE for the model 
with no money is compared with that of the model with simple-sum M1 money, the 2.45 and 
2.48, are obtained, respectively, at one step ahead, and 16.92 and 17.53, respectively, at 12 steps 
ahead. The model with only the interest rate performs better till 12 steps ahead. The model with 
money then starts playing an informative role in the exchange rate forecast with RMSE values of 
19.54 and 16.48 being obtained at the 16
th
 and 24
th 
steps. In contrast, the no-money model has 
RMSE values of 21.52 and 19.35. However, low RMSEs are obtained at every forecast horizon 
when the model with Divisia M3 is compared with the simple-sum M3 model or the no-money 
model.   
The theory establishes the indispensable role of money in modelling exchange rates. Hence, the 
monetary aggregate variable is added in the forecasting analysis. Adding money improves the 
forecasting performance of some countries even though it implies losing degrees of freedom in 
the regression. Otherwise, the approach does not damage the forecasting performance in those 
countries to the extent that would be expected in terms of losing degrees of freedom. Moreover, 
Divisia money models are observed to persistently and unambiguously outperform models with 
simple-sum money. 
The following forecast graphs have been obtained through Gibbs sampling on a Bayesian VAR 
with a “Minnesota” prior. The sequential likelihood ratio test selects 13 lags for India, the UK, 
and Poland. A part of the data has been held back to evaluate the forecast performance. The 
graph forecasts 24 steps ahead with a ±2 standard error band using 2,500 draws. The out-of-the-
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sample simulations account for all uncertainty in forecasts of the uncertainty of coefficients 
(handled by Gibbs sampling) and shocks during the forecast period (see Doan, 2012). 
Figure 7: INDIA 
 
 
Figure 7 represents the out-of-sample forecasting graph for India and compares models with 
simple-sum M3 and models with Divisia M3. The model forecast with Divisia M3 (represented 
in coral) stays close to the actual log of the exchange rate (with the LER represented in black). 
The model forecast with simple-sum M3 (represented in blue) diverges from the actual value 
over time. The forecast band for the model with Divisia M3 (represented in pink) is narrower 
than the forecast band for the model with simple-sum M3 (represented in green). This finding 
indicates higher forecasting accuracy in models with Divisia money than models with simple-
sum money. 
Figure 8 represents the out-of-sample forecasting graph for the UK and provides a comparison 
between the model with M1 money and the model with the narrow Divisia. The model forecast 
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with Divisia (represented in coral) closely follows the actual LER value (represented in black). 
The model forecast with M1 money (represented in blue) does not follow the actual value over a 
considerable period of the forecast horizon. In the initial forecast horizon, the forecast bands for 
the model with Divisia (represented in pink) are relatively narrower than the forecast band for 
the model with M1 money (represented in green). The narrow bands imply that the model with 
Divisia can predict the exchange rate with greater precision. 
 
Figure 8: UK 
 
 
 
Figure 9 represents the out-of-sample forecasting graph for Poland and provides a comparison 
between the model with simple-sum M1 and model with the Divisia M1. The model forecasts 
with Divisia M1 are represented in blue), simple-sum M1, represented in coral, and the actual 
LER value is represented in black. The model forecasts with the Divisia M1 perform better than 
the simple-sum M1. When the actual exchange rate fell over the period 2013–14, the point 
forecast of the exchange rate from the model with Divisia was lower than the point forecast with 
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the model with simple sum and closer to the actual exchange rate. Similarly, when the exchange 
rate increased during the latter months of 2014, the point forecast of the exchange rate from 
Divisia models exceeded the point forecast from their simple-sum counterparts. Hence, the 
model with Divisia money helps in forecasting the exchange rate with high accuracy. The 
forecast band for the model with Divisia M1 is represented in green while the forecast band for 
the model with simple-sum M1 is represented in pink. 
Figure 9: POLAND 
 
 
The relative forecasting performance of models has been evaluated by using the out-of-sample 
forecasting graphs and RMSE statistics. It may be concluded here that models with Divisia 
money consistently perform better than models with simple-sum money. These findings support 
the superiority of Divisia money models over models with no money in terms of their 
contribution to the forecasting of exchange rates in both the short and long runs. 
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5. Conclusion 
This study has examined whether structural VAR models based on the traditional, new 
Keynesian small and open economy frameworks are able to correctly identify monetary policy 
shocks that cause exchange rate fluctuations. The findings of the study justify doubts about this 
outcome, especially during the period coinciding with the recession of 2007-09 when the central 
banks employed an unconventional monetary policy. The paper has also investigated the role of 
money in determining the exchange rate. The monetary aggregate has been incorporated in a 
traditional VAR (based on the New Keynesian setting) wherein the interest rate is the sole 
monetary policy instrument. Models with monetary aggregates, including both simple sum and 
Divisia aggregates, provide theoretically correct estimates, and significant responses in terms of 
prices, output, money and exchange rate to a monetary policy shock. This finding implies that 
the model presented in this paper accurately reflects the prevalent situation in small, open 
economies. Further, the use of the model with Divisia monetary aggregate suggests an impact 
appreciation of the exchange rate in monetary policy shocks, which subsequently results in 
impact depreciation.  
An analysis of the variance decomposition of forecast error in the exchange rate to monetary 
policy shocks also points to moderate but consistent improvements in the explanatory power of 
monetary policy. This finding is particularly true for models that adopt monetary aggregates, 
especially with regard to the comparison between Divisia money and the no-money model. 
These findings have been correlated to the emerging market economies of India, Poland and the 
UK. It has concomitantly been observed that the monetary policy and money demand together 
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can explain up to 22 per cent, 33 per cent, and 35 per cent of the variation in the exchange rate 
for India, Poland, and the UK, respectively. The results also support the superiority of Divisia 
money models in forecasting exchange rates as compared to models with no money. Moreover, 
the findings confirm the results derived by Barnett and Kwag (2005), and Barnett et al. (2016) 
that the introduction of Divisia aggregates can help in appraisal of the money market equilibrium 
as also improve the predictive power of monetary policy with regard to exchange rate volatility. 
Hence, these results reinforce the need to introduce monetary aggregates, especially Divisia, into 
the structural VAR models of open economies.  
 
References: 
Barnett, W.A., 2012, Getting It Wrong: How Faulty Monetary Statistics Undermine the Fed, 
the Financial System, and the Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Barnett, W.A., 1980, “Economic Monetary Aggregate: An Application of Index Number and 
Aggregation Theory”. Journal of Econometrics, September, 1980. 
Barnett, W.A., Bhadury, S.S., and Ghosh, T., 2016, “A SVAR Approach to Evaluation  of 
Monetary Policy in India”, Open Economies Review, Volume 27, Issue 5, pp. 871–93. 
Barnett, W.A., and Kwag, Chang Ho, 2005, “Exchange Rate Determination from Monetary 
Fundamentals: An Aggregation Theoretic Approach”, Frontiers in Finance and Economics, 
Volume 3, Issue 1, pp.29-48. 
Barnett, W.A. and Chauvet, M., 2011, Financial Aggregation and Index Number Theory, World 
Scientific, Singapore. 
43 
 
Barnett, W.A., Liu, J., Mattson, R.S., and van den Noort, J., 2013, “The New CFS Divisia 
Monetary Aggregates: Design, Construction, and Data Sources,” Open Economies Review, 
Volume 24, pp. 101–24. 
Bernanke, B., 1986, “Alternative Explanations of Money Income Correlation”, in K. Brunner 
and A.H. Matzler (eds.), Real Business Cycles, Real Exchange Rates, and Actual Policies, 
Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 25, North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 49-99. 
Bjornland, H.C., 2009, “Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Overshooting: Dornbusch Was 
Right After All”, Journal of International Economics, Volume 79, pp. 64-77. 
Belongia, M. and Binner, J., 2001, Divisia Monetary Aggregates: Theory and Practice, Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK. 
Belongia, M.T. and Ireland, P.N., 2015, “Interest Rates and Money in the Measurement of 
Monetary Policy”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Volume 33, Issue 2, pp. 255-69, 
DOI: 10.1080/07350015.2014.946132. 
Cochrane, J.H., 2007, “Inflation Determination with Taylor Rules: A Critical Review”, NBER 
Working Paper No.  13409. 
Christiano, L.J., Motto, R. and Rostagno, M. 2007, “Two Reasons Why Money and Credit May 
be Useful in Monetary Policy”, NBER Working Paper No. 13502. 
Clarida, R., Galí, J., and Gertler, M., 2001, “Optimal Monetary Policy in Open Versus Closed 
Economies: An Integrated Approach”, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 
Volume 91, pp. 248–52. 
44 
 
Cover, J.P., and Mallick, S.K. 2012, “Identifying Sources of Macroeconomic and Exchange Rate 
Fluctuations in the UK”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Volume 31, Issue 6, pp. 
1627-48. 
Cushman, David O. and Tao, Zha, 1997, “Identifying Monetary Policy in a Small Open 
Economy under Flexible Exchange Rates”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 39, Issue 3, 
pp. 433-48.  
Darvas, Z., 2013, “Monetary Transmission in Three Central European Economies: Evidence 
from Time Varying Coefficient Vector”, Empirica, Vol. 40, Issue 2, pp. 363-90. 
Doan, T., 2013, RATS Manual, Version 8.3, Estima, Evanston, IL.  
Doan, T., 2012, RATS Handbook for Bayesian Econometrics, Estima, Evanston, IL. 
Emirmahmutoglu, F., and Kose, N., 2011, “Testing for Granger Causality in Heterogeneous 
Mixed Panels”, Economic Modelling, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp. 870-76. 
Goodfriend, M., and Lacker, M. J., 1999, “Limited Commitment and Central Bank Lending”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper WP 99-02.  
Hamilton, J., 1994, Time Series Econometrics, Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Hendrickson, J.R., 2014, “Redundancy and ‘Mismeasurement’? A Reappraisal of Money”, 
Macroeconomic Dynamics, Volume 18, pp. 1437–65. 
Holtemöller, O., and S. Mallick, 2016, “Global Food Prices and Monetary Policy in an Emerging 
Market Economy: The case of India”, Asian Journal of Economics, Volume 46, pp. 56-70. 
45 
 
Kapuscinski, M., Kyziak, T., Przystupa, J., Stanislawska, E., Sznajderska, A., and Wrobel, E., 
2013, “Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism in Poland. What Do We Know in 2013”, 
Narodowy Ban Polski, NBP Working Paper No. 180. 
Kim, S., and Roubini, N. 2000. “Exchange Rate Anomalies in the Industrial Countries: A 
Solution with a Structural VAR Approach”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 45, Issue 
3, pp. 561-86. 
Kim, S., 2005, “Monetary Policy, Foreign Exchange Rate Policy, Delayed Overshooting”, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 37, Issue 4, August. 
Lane, P., 2003, “Business cycles and macroeconomic policy in emerging market economies”, 
International Finance, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp. 89–108. 
Leeper, E.M., and Roush, J.E., 2003, “Putting “M” Back in Monetary Policy”, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Volume 35, Issue 6, pp. 1217–1256. 
Levine, P., 2012, “Monetary Policy in an Uncertain World: Probability Models and the Design of 
Robust Monetary Rules”, Indian Growth and Development Review, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp. 70-
88. 
Litterman, R.B., and Weiss, L.M., 1985, “Money, Real Interest Rates, and Output: A 
Reinterpretation of Postwar U.S. Data”, Econometrica, Econometric Society, Volume 53, Issue 
1, pp. 129-56, January. 
Mallick, S.K., and Sousa, R.M., 2012, “Real Effects of Monetary Policy in Large Emerging 
Economies”, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Volume 16, Issue S2, pp. 190-212. 
46 
 
Mantalos, P., 2007, “A Graphical Investigation of the Size and Power of the Granger-Causality 
Tests in Integrated-Cointegrated VAR Systems”, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & 
Econometrics, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp. 17-33.  
Mantalos, P. and Shukur, G., 1998, “Size and Power of the Error Correction Model 
Cointegration Test. A Bootstrap Approach”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics & Statistics, Volume 
60, Issue 2, pp. 249-55. 
Mishkin, F.S., 2000, “Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Countries”, American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings, Volume 90, Issue 2, pp. 105-09. 
Nachane, D.M., and Dubey, A.K., 2011, “The Vanishing Role of Money in the Macro-economy: 
An Empirical Investigation for India”, Economic Modelling, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp. 859-69. 
Paul, S. and Ramachandran, M., 2011, “Currency Equivalent Monetary Aggregates as Leading 
Indicators of Inflation”, Economic Modelling, Volume 28, Issue 4, pp. 2041-48. 
Ramachandran, M., Das, R., and Bhoi, B., 2010, “The Divisia Monetary Indices as Leading 
Indicators of Inflation”, Reserve Bank of India Development Research Group Study No. 36, 
Mumbai. 
Stock, J., and Watson, M. 1999, “Forecasting Inflation”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Volume 44, pp. 293-335. 
Sims, C.A., 1980, “Macroeconomics and Reality”, Econometrica, Volume 48, pp. 1-48. 
Sims, C.A., 1980, “Comparison of Inter-war and Post-war Business Cycles: Monetarism 
Reconsidered”, American Economic Association, Volume 70, Issue 2, pp. 250-57, May. 
47 
 
Sims, C.A., Stock, J.H. and Watson, M.W., 1990, “Inference in Linear Time Series Models with 
Some Unit Roots”, Econometrica, Volume 58, pp. 113-144. 
Taylor, J.B., 1999, Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press, 0-226-79124-6. 
 
Appendix: 
 
Table A: Lag Selection Test 
 
INDIA 
 (7 vs 6 Lags) (6 vs 5 Lags) (5 vs 4 Lags) 
    Significance 
 Level 
   Significance 
 Level 
   Significance 
 Level 
Model (DM3) 38.49 0.86 73.66 0.01 57.88 0.18 
Model (M3) 38.24 0.87 54.12 0.29 69.43 0.03 
Model (DL1) 39.09 0.84 74.33 0.01 58.11 0.17 
Model (DM2) 49.71 0.44 80.31 0.00 70.37 0.02 
 
UK 
 (13 vs 12 lags) (12 vs 11 lags) (11 vs 10 lags) 
    Significance 
 Level 
   Significance 
 Level 
   Significance 
 Level 
Model (M1) 94.17 0.00 86.43 0.00 53.51 0.31 
Model (M3) 96.44 0.00 67.77 0.04 76.33 0.01 
Model(Divisia) 84.86 0.00 76.54 0.01 69.00 0.03 
 
POLAND 
 (14 vs 13 lags) (13 vs 12 lags) (12 vs 11 lags) 
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   Significance 
 Level 
   Significance 
 Level 
   Significance 
 Level 
Model (M1) 73.04 0.01 101.33 0.00 59.43 0.15 
Model (M3) 65.66 0.06 112.11 0.00 76.33 0.01 
Model(Div1) 79.60 0.00 104.24 0.00 60.91 0.12 
Model(Div3) 68.02 0.04 111.96 0.00 68.02 0.04 
 
 
Table B: Largest Eigen Value 
India 
Lags Lags 6 Lag 4 
 Model with M1  0.995655 0.995452 
Model with M3 0.998252 0.999864 
Model with DM3 0.980700  0.978289 
UK 
Lags Lags 13 Lag 6 
Model with M1 0.998290 0.975593 
Model with M3 0.980230  0.973018 
Model with Divisia 0.999294  0.971836 
Poland 
Lags Lags 13 Lag 6 
Model with M1  0.991314  0.987834 
Model with M3  0.988180 0.988290 
Model with Div3 0.986030 0.988290 
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Table C: MC Diagnostic Test 
Null Hypothesis: Both parts of the chain are asymptotically independent 
 India (Model with DM3) UK(Model with Divisia) Poland(Model with Divisia 3) 
 Variable 
Coefficient 
NSE CD Variable 
Coefficient 
NSE CD NSE Variable 
Coefficient 
CD 
b21 0.002      0 3.22 0 0 1.258 0.001 0 0.228 
b31 -0.008      0.002 -0.856 0.029 0.001 -0.511 -0.015 0.001 -0.889 
b32 -0.157      0.071 -0.327 0.748 0.033 0.09 3.203 0.083 0.593 
b41 0.018      0.001 0.487 -0.022 0 -0.241 -0.002 0 0.665 
b43 0.086      0.002 -0.66 -0.029 0.002 -0.375 0 0.001 -0.122 
b52 -0.274      0.059 -0.716 -0.539 0.023 -0.697 -3.604 0.144 0.584 
b53 0.078      0.005 -2.239 -0.154 0.004 0.172 -0.282 0.009 -1.454 
b54 -0.037      0.01 -1.662 0.002 0.012 2.038 -0.235 0.032 0.409 
b56 -0.218      0.235 -1.849 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b57 -0.178      0.018 -0.75 -0.038 0.012 -0.414 -0.143 0.015 1.18 
b61 -0.003      0 2.561 0.004 0 -0.973 -0.007 0 0.966 
b65 0.001      0.008 0.123 0.043 0.005 0.814 0.005 0.001 1.328 
b67 -0.016      0.005 -2.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b71 -0.074      0.003 0.008 0.057 0.005 -0.717 0.151 0.003 -0.753 
b72 1.770      0.066 -0.052 0.74 0.191 1.259 6.84 0.144 0.35 
b73 0.293      0.011 0.279 0.146 0.041 -0.6 -0.764 0.018 1.694 
b74 -0.468      0.02 2.407 -0.413 0.071 1.055 -0.194 0.05 -0.241 
b75 1.170      0.079 -0.621 0.269 0.269 -0.208 0.703 0.039 -1.538 
b76 5.028      0.253 2.317 0.156 0.156 -2.358 3.092 0.114 -0.59 
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Figure C: Impulse Response Functions due to Monetary Policy Shocks 
Recursive Model with No-Money 
India UK Poland 
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Figure D: Impulse Response Functions due to Monetary Policy Shocks 
Non-Recursive Model with No-Money 
India UK Poland 
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Figure E: INDIA 
Impulse Responses for Monetary Policy Shocks (Estimation period: Jan 2000- Jan 2008, Lags=4) 
Model with Divisia M3 Model with M3  
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 Figure F: UK 
Impulse responses for Monetary Policy Shocks  
(Estimation Period 1999 Jan - 2013 Dec) 
Model with Divisia Money Model with M1 Money Model with M3 Money 
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 Figure G: POLAND 
Impulse Responses for Monetary Policy Shocks 
 (Estimation Period 2005 Dec- 2015 June, Lags=6) 
Model with Divisia M3 Model with M3  
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Figure H: INDIA 
Impulse Responses for Money Demand Shocks 
 Lags = 6, Divisia 
DM3 
Lags = 6, M3 Lags = 4, Divisia 
DM3 
Lags = 4, M3 
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Figure I: UK 
Impulse responses for Monetary Demand Shocks  
 Lags = 13, NDivisia 
(2001 Jan-2013 Jan) 
Lags = 13, M1 
(2001 Jan-2013 Jan) 
Lags = 6, NDivisia 
(1999 Jan-2013 Dec) 
Lags =6,  M1 
(1999 Jan-2013 Dec) 
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Figure J: POLAND 
Impulse Responses for Monetary Demand Shocks 
 Lags = 13, Divisia3 
(2001 Dec-2015 
June) 
Lags = 13, M3 
(2001 Dec-2015 
June) 
Lags = 6, Divisia3 
(1999 Jan-2013 Dec) 
Lags =6,  M3 
(1999 Jan-2013 Dec) 
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